sanitizer

The tracking issue for this feature is: #39699.


This feature allows for use of one of following sanitizers:

To enable a sanitizer compile with -Zsanitizer=address, -Zsanitizer=leak, -Zsanitizer=memory or -Zsanitizer=thread. Only a single sanitizer can be enabled at a time.

AddressSanitizer

AddressSanitizer is a memory error detector. It can detect the following types of bugs:

  • Out of bound accesses to heap, stack and globals
  • Use after free
  • Use after return (runtime flag ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_stack_use_after_return=1)
  • Use after scope
  • Double-free, invalid free
  • Memory leaks

AddressSanitizer is supported on the following targets:

  • x86_64-apple-darwin
  • x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu

AddressSanitizer works with non-instrumented code although it will impede its ability to detect some bugs. It is not expected to produce false positive reports.

Examples

Stack buffer overflow:

fn main() {
    let xs = [0, 1, 2, 3];
    let _y = unsafe { *xs.as_ptr().offset(4) };
}
$ export RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address RUSTDOCFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address
$ cargo run -Zbuild-std --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
==37882==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffe400e6250 at pc 0x5609a841fb20 bp 0x7ffe400e6210 sp 0x7ffe400e6208
READ of size 4 at 0x7ffe400e6250 thread T0
    #0 0x5609a841fb1f in example::main::h628ffc6626ed85b2 /.../src/main.rs:3:23
    ...

Address 0x7ffe400e6250 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 48 in frame
    #0 0x5609a841f8af in example::main::h628ffc6626ed85b2 /.../src/main.rs:1

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 48) 'xs' (line 2) <== Memory access at offset 48 overflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
      (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow /.../src/main.rs:3:23 in example::main::h628ffc6626ed85b2
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x100048014bf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100048014c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100048014c10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100048014c20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100048014c30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x100048014c40: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00[f3]f3 00 00 00 00
  0x100048014c50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100048014c60: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100048014c70: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100048014c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
  0x100048014c90: 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
  Shadow gap:              cc
==37882==ABORTING

Use of a stack object after its scope has already ended:

static mut P: *mut usize = std::ptr::null_mut();

fn main() {
    unsafe {
        {
            let mut x = 0;
            P = &mut x;
        }
        std::ptr::write_volatile(P, 123);
    }
}
$ export RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address RUSTDOCFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address
$ cargo run -Zbuild-std --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
=================================================================
==39249==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-scope on address 0x7ffc7ed3e1a0 at pc 0x55c98b262a8e bp 0x7ffc7ed3e050 sp 0x7ffc7ed3e048
WRITE of size 8 at 0x7ffc7ed3e1a0 thread T0
    #0 0x55c98b262a8d in core::ptr::write_volatile::he21f1df5a82f329a /.../src/rust/src/libcore/ptr/mod.rs:1048:5
    #1 0x55c98b262cd2 in example::main::h628ffc6626ed85b2 /.../src/main.rs:9:9
    ...

Address 0x7ffc7ed3e1a0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c98b262bdf in example::main::h628ffc6626ed85b2 /.../src/main.rs:3

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 40) 'x' (line 6) <== Memory access at offset 32 is inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
      (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-scope /.../src/rust/src/libcore/ptr/mod.rs:1048:5 in core::ptr::write_volatile::he21f1df5a82f329a
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x10000fd9fbe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10000fd9fbf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10000fd9fc00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
  0x10000fd9fc10: f8 f8 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10000fd9fc20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x10000fd9fc30: f1 f1 f1 f1[f8]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10000fd9fc40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
  0x10000fd9fc50: 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10000fd9fc60: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3
  0x10000fd9fc70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10000fd9fc80: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
  Shadow gap:              cc
==39249==ABORTING

MemorySanitizer

MemorySanitizer is detector of uninitialized reads. It is only supported on the x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu target.

MemorySanitizer requires all program code to be instrumented. C/C++ dependencies need to be recompiled using Clang with -fsanitize=memory option. Failing to achieve that will result in false positive reports.

Example

Detecting the use of uninitialized memory. The -Zbuild-std flag rebuilds and instruments the standard library, and is strictly necessary for the correct operation of the tool. The -Zsanitizer-track-origins enables tracking of the origins of uninitialized memory:

use std::mem::MaybeUninit;

fn main() {
    unsafe {
        let a = MaybeUninit::<[usize; 4]>::uninit();
        let a = a.assume_init();
        println!("{}", a[2]);
    }
}
$ export \
  CC=clang \
  CXX=clang++ \
  CFLAGS='-fsanitize=memory -fsanitize-memory-track-origins' \
  CXXFLAGS='-fsanitize=memory -fsanitize-memory-track-origins' \
  RUSTFLAGS='-Zsanitizer=memory -Zsanitizer-memory-track-origins' \
  RUSTDOCFLAGS='-Zsanitizer=memory -Zsanitizer-memory-track-origins'
$ cargo clean
$ cargo run -Zbuild-std --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
==9416==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
    #0 0x560c04f7488a in core::fmt::num::imp::fmt_u64::haa293b0b098501ca $RUST/build/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/stage1/lib/rustlib/src/rust/src/libcore/fmt/num.rs:202:16
...
  Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
    #0 0x560c04ae898a in __msan_memcpy.part.0 $RUST/src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/msan/msan_interceptors.cc:1558:3
    #1 0x560c04b2bf88 in memory::main::hd2333c1899d997f5 $CWD/src/main.rs:6:16

  Uninitialized value was created by an allocation of 'a' in the stack frame of function '_ZN6memory4main17hd2333c1899d997f5E'
    #0 0x560c04b2bc50 in memory::main::hd2333c1899d997f5 $CWD/src/main.rs:3

ThreadSanitizer

ThreadSanitizer is a data race detection tool. It is supported on the following targets:

  • x86_64-apple-darwin
  • x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu

To work correctly ThreadSanitizer needs to be "aware" of all synchronization operations in a program. It generally achieves that through combination of library interception (for example synchronization performed through pthread_mutex_lock / pthread_mutex_unlock) and compile time instrumentation (e.g. atomic operations). Using it without instrumenting all the program code can lead to false positive reports.

ThreadSanitizer does not support atomic fences std::sync::atomic::fence, nor synchronization performed using inline assembly code.

Example

static mut A: usize = 0;

fn main() {
    let t = std::thread::spawn(|| {
        unsafe { A += 1 };
    });
    unsafe { A += 1 };

    t.join().unwrap();
}
$ export RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=thread RUSTDOCFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=thread
$ cargo run -Zbuild-std --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
==================
WARNING: ThreadSanitizer: data race (pid=10574)
  Read of size 8 at 0x5632dfe3d030 by thread T1:
    #0 example::main::_$u7b$$u7b$closure$u7d$$u7d$::h23f64b0b2f8c9484 ../src/main.rs:5:18 (example+0x86cec)
    ...

  Previous write of size 8 at 0x5632dfe3d030 by main thread:
    #0 example::main::h628ffc6626ed85b2 /.../src/main.rs:7:14 (example+0x868c8)
    ...
    #11 main <null> (example+0x86a1a)

  Location is global 'example::A::h43ac149ddf992709' of size 8 at 0x5632dfe3d030 (example+0x000000bd9030)

Instrumentation of external dependencies and std

The sanitizers to varying degrees work correctly with partially instrumented code. On the one extreme is LeakSanitizer that doesn't use any compile time instrumentation, on the other is MemorySanitizer that requires that all program code to be instrumented (failing to achieve that will inevitably result in false positives).

It is strongly recommended to combine sanitizers with recompiled and instrumented standard library, for example using cargo -Zbuild-std functionality.

Build scripts and procedural macros

Use of sanitizers together with build scripts and procedural macros is technically possible, but in almost all cases it would be best avoided. This is especially true for procedural macros which would require an instrumented version of rustc.

In more practical terms when using cargo always remember to pass --target flag, so that rustflags will not be applied to build scripts and procedural macros.

Symbolizing the Reports

Sanitizers produce symbolized stacktraces when llvm-symbolizer binary is in PATH.

Additional Information